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Abstract—We examine the secrecy performance of three
artificial-noise-aided secure transmission schemes, namely, the
partially-adaptive, fully-adaptive, and on-off schemes. To this
end, we provide new analysis to facilitate the optimization of the
fraction  of the transmit power allocated to the useful signal
and redundancy rate RE. Surprisingly, our examination indicates
that the partially-adaptive scheme, in which only the codeword
rate RB varies with the instantaneous channel gains, significantly
outperforms the on-off scheme, in which both RB and RE vary.
This performance gain can be characterized in terms of a higher
average secrecy rate, subject to an upper bound on the secrecy
outage probability. Furthermore, our results also demonstrate
that the partially-adaptive scheme can achieve almost the same
secrecy performance as the fully-adaptive scheme, which is of a
much higher complexity, where , RB, and RE all vary with the
instantaneous channel gains.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, artificial noise, power
allocation, wiretap code rates, secure transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
Security and privacy are critical in existing and future
wireless networks since a large amount of confidential infor-
mation is wirelessly transferred over the open medium [1].
Against this background, as a compatible and complementary
technique to the conventional cryptography, physical layer
security has been developed to address the security issues in
wireless communications (e.g. [2–4]). Physical layer security
offers progressively higher levels of security, conditioned on
assumptions about the system model and adversary capa-
bilities. In physical layer security, an eavesdropper (Eve)
attempts to intercept the data transmission from a transmitter
(Alice) to a legitimate receiver (Bob). The recent development
of physical layer security in the context of multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) techniques is in conjunction with
artificial-noise-aided secure transmissions. Collectively, these
techniques provide robustness and other desirable performance
attributes in the passive eavesdropping scenario (e.g., [5, 6]).
In the literature, three different artificial-noise-aided se-
cure transmission schemes, namely, partially-adaptive, fully-
adaptive, and on-off schemes, have been proposed [7–9]. In
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the partially-adaptive scheme, only the codeword rate RB is
adaptively chosen based on the instantaneous channel state
information (CSI) of the main channel from Alice to Bob,
while the parameter , which denotes the fraction of the
transmit power allocated to the useful signal (1    of the
transmit power is allocated to the artificial noise (AN)), and the
redundancy rate RE are fixed [7]. In the fully-adaptive scheme,
RB, RE, and  are all adaptively varied with the instantaneous
CSI of the main channel [8]. In the on-off scheme, both
RB and RE are adaptively chosen as per the instantaneous
CSI of the main channel, while  is fixed [9]. This on-off
scheme is different from the non-adaptive encoding scheme
proposed and analyzed in [10, 11], where RB, RE, and  are
all fixed and independent of the instantaneous CSI of the main
channel. As such, the complexity of the non-adaptive encoding
scheme is lower than that of the on-off scheme and thus its
secrecy performance would not be better than that of the on-off
scheme. Therefore, we do not adopt the non-adaptive encoding
scheme but the on-off scheme as one benchmark.
The secrecy performance comparison between the on-off
and fully-adaptive schemes has been conducted in [8], which,
as expected, shows that the fully-adaptive scheme outperforms
the on-off scheme at the cost of a much higher complexity.
The authors of [11] examined the secrecy performance of the
non-adaptive encoding scheme and the fully-adaptive scheme,
which demonstrates that the fully-adaptive scheme achieves
a higher throughput than the non-adaptive encoding scheme.
However, the secrecy performance of the partially-adaptive
scheme compared with that of other schemes has never been
thoroughly examined. This leaves an important gap in our
understanding on the AN-aided secure transmission schemes
and motivates this work.
In this work, we thoroughly examine the secrecy perfor-
mance of the partially-adaptive scheme with the fully-adaptive
and on-off schemes as benchmarks. To this end, we conduct
novel analysis to facilitate the optimization of the power
allocation parameter  and the redundancy rate RE in the
partially-adaptive and fully-adaptive schemes. Specifically, we
derive the closed-form expression for the average secrecy rate
in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime and prove the
existence and uniqueness of the optimal RE for any given 
in the partially-adaptive scheme. In addition, the optimal RE
and  are analytically obtained for the fully-adaptive scheme
in two asymptotic scenarios, where the requirement on the
instantaneous CSI of the main channel is determined for secure
transmission. Surprisingly, our examinations indicate that the
partially-adaptive scheme significantly outperforms the on-off
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scheme in terms of achieving a much higher average secrecy
rate subject to the constraint on the secrecy outage probability,
while the complexity of these two schemes are similar. Fur-
thermore, the partially-adaptive scheme can achieve almost the
same secrecy performance as the fully-adaptive scheme that is
of a much higher complexity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wiretap channel where communication from
an N -antenna Alice to a single-antenna Bob is overheard
by a single-antenna Eve. We denote the main channel as
the 1  N complex-valued vector h and the eavesdropper’s
channel from Alice to Eve as the 1  N complex-valued
vector g. Each entry of h and g is modeled as an independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variable.
Considering passive eavesdropping, we assume that g is not
available at Alice. We also assume that h is known exactly by
Bob and fed back to Alice perfectly. We further assume that
h is perfectly available at Eve, since the feedback from Bob
to Alice may not be secure.
We next detail the AN-aided secure transmission in the
considered wiretap channel. Alice transmits an information
signal sI in conjunction with an (N   1) 1 AN vector sN to
Bob, where the variance of sI is I and each entry of sN has the
variance N [8]. We assume that the total transmit power used
by Alice is Pt. We denote the fraction of the power allocated
to sI as  such that I = Pt, where 0    1. Since Alice
does not know g, she equally distributes the transmit power of
AN to each entry of sN such that N = (1  )Pt= (N   1).
In order to transmit sI and sN, Alice designs an N  N
beamforming matrix V given by V = [vI VN], where vI
is used to transmit sI and VN is used to transmit sN. The
aim of V is to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel quality
by transmitting sN in all directions except towards Bob. To
determine V, Alice performs the eigenvalue decomposition of
F , hHh, where hH is the Hermitian transpose of h. Then
Alice chooses vI as the principal eigenvector corresponding to
the largest eigenvalue of F and chooses VN as the remaining
N   1 eigenvectors of F such that VN lies in the nullspace of
hH . Therefore, the N  1 transmitted signal vector at Alice,
x, is given by
x = [vI VN]

sI
sN

= vIsI + VNsN: (1)
According to (1), the received signal at Bob is given by
y = hx+ nB = hvIsI + nB; (2)
where nB is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob
satisfying E

nBn
H
B

= 2B. Based on (2), the instantaneous
SNR at Bob is given by B = B khk2, where B = Pt=2B.
As such, the probability density function (pdf) of B is [8]
fB ()=
N 1e 

B
(B)
N (N)
; (3)
and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of B is
FB ()=1 
 

N; B

 (N)
=1 e  B
N 1X
n=0
1
n!


B
n
: (4)
According to (1), the received signal at Eve is given by
z = gx+ nE = gvIsI + gVNsN + nE; (5)
where nE is the AWGN at Eve satisfying E

nEn
H
E

= 2E. It
is crucial to clarify that although Eve knows h and V, she
cannot eliminate the interference caused by VNsN due to the
existence of nE (i.e., a non-zero 2E). If 
2
E = 0, i.e., Eve is a
noise-free device, she can eliminate this interference when she
is equipped with more antennas than Alice. Following (5), the
instantaneous signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at
Eve is given by [8]
E =
E kgvIk2
1 
N 1E kgVNk2 + 1
; (6)
where E = Pt=
2
E. In the wiretap channel, we assume that B
and E are publicly known. If Alice does not know them, she
is still able to perform the AN-aided secure data transmission,
but not able to calculate the secrecy performance metrics.
Following (6), the cdf of E is obtained as [8]
FE () = 1 

1 +
(1  ) 
 (N   1)
1 N
e
  E : (7)
III. THREE AN-AIDED SECURE TRANSMISSION SCHEMES
In this section, we first detail the three AN-aided secure
transmission schemes. We then formalize the optimization of
the power allocation parameter  and redundancy rate RE for
the three schemes. We also provide novel analysis on the
relationship between  and RE in the partially-adaptive and
fully-adaptive schemes to facilitate the optimization.
A. Partially-Adaptive Scheme
In the partially-adaptive scheme, RB is set such as RB = CB
and RE is fixed for each pair of B and E, where CB =
log2(1 + B) [7]. A secure transmission requires a positive
secrecy rate, i.e., Rs = CB RE > 0, and thus Alice only
transmits signals when CB > RE. As such, the transmission
probability of the partially-adaptive scheme is
Pp(;RE) = Pr(CB > RE) =
 

N; 2
RE 1
B

 (N)
: (8)
Then, for given  and RE its average secrecy rate is
Rp(;RE) = E [CB  RE]+
=
Z 1
2RE 1
[CB  RE]+ fB(B)dB; (9)
where [x]+ = maxf0; xg. The closed-form expression for
Rp(;RE) is mathematically intractable due to the complicat-
ed integration in (9). As such, we derive a compact expression
for Rp(;RE) for the high SNR regime in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: In the high SNR regime, the average secrecy
rate of the partially-adaptive scheme is derived as
Rp(;RE)=
1
ln(2) (N)
G3;02;3

1; 1
0; 0; N
2RE 1B

+
log2(2
RE 1)
 (N)
 

N;
2RE   1
B

 
RE 

N; 2
RE 1
B

 (N)
; (10)
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where Gp;qm;n

a1; : : : ; ap
b1; : : : ; bq
 x is the Meijer’s G-Function
given by [12, Eq. (9.301)].
Proof: In the high SNR regime, we can approximte CB
as CB = log2(B). Then, substituting (3) and (4) into (9), we
have
Rp(;RE)=
Z 1
2RE 1
CBfB(B)dB RE
 
1 FB
 
2RE 1 ;
=
Z 1
2RE 1
ln(B)
ln(2)
N 1B e
  BB
(B)
N (N)
dB 
RE 

N; 2
RE 1
B

 (N)
:
(11)
Following the definition of the Meijer’s G-Function, we have
1
bn
Z 1
a
ln(x)xn 1e 
x
b dx
= G3;02;3

1; 1
0; 0; n
 ab

+ ln(a) 

n;
a
b

: (12)
Then, substituting (12) into (11) we obtain the desired result
in (10) after some algebraic manipulations, which completes
the proof of this proposition.
The compact expression given in (10) allows us to efficiently
examine the secrecy performance of the partially-adaptive
scheme, based on which some system parameters can be
optimized via numerical search methods, without incurring
time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations.
In the partially-adaptive scheme, the secrecy outage occurs
when CE > RE conditioned on a transmission, where CE =
log2(1 + E). Thus, its secrecy outage probability is given by
Op(;RE) = Pr(CE > REjCB > RE) = Pr(CE > RE)
= 1 FE
 
2RE 1 = 1 Ne  (2RE 1)E ; (13)
where
 = 1 +
(1  )  2RE 1
 (N   1) ; (14)
since CB and CE are independent from each other.
In the partially-adaptive scheme, in addition to RE,  is
fixed for each pair of B and E. The optimal values of RE
and  in the partially-adaptive scheme can be obtained through
(y; RyE)= argmax
0<1;RE
Rp(;RE); s.t. Op(;RE)  p0: (15)
Due to the intractable expression of Rp(;RE), it is hard, if
not impossible, to prove the concavity of (15) with respect to
both RE and . Noting the closed interval of  (i.e., 0   
1), in the following proposition we analytically prove that for
any given  there is a unique solution to RE that maximizes
Rp(;RE) subject to Op(;RE)  p0.
Proposition 2: For any given , there is a unique value of
RE that maximizes Rp(;RE) subject to Op(;RE)  p0 and
this value is the one that guarantees Op(;RE) = p0.
Proof: If we can prove that for any given , both
Rp(;RE) and Op(;RE) are monotonic decreasing functions
of RE, this proposition can be proved. As such, we next derive
the first derivatives of Rp(;RE) and Op(;RE) with respect
to RE, respectively. Following (9) and the Leibniz’s rule, we
have
@Rp(;RE)
@RE
=  [CB  RE]+fB(B)2RE ln(2)
 
Z 1
2RE 1
fB(B)dB: (16)
By noting that [CB   RE]+  0 and fB(B)  0, we find
that @Rp(;RE)=@RE < 0, which proves that Rp(;RE)
monotonically decreases with RE. Following (13), the first
derivative of Op(;RE) with respect to RE is derived as
@Op(;RE)
@RE
=  2
RE ln(2)
E
e
  (2
RE 1)
E 1 N
  1  

e
  (2
RE 1)
E  N : (17)
By noting  > 0 as per (14) due to N > 1, we find that
@Op(;RE)=@RE < 0, which proves that Op(;RE) is a
monotonic decreasing function of RE.
According to Proposition 2, we conclude that for any given
 the optimal RE can be searched by increasing RE from
zero to the value of it that ensures Op(;RE) = p0. Then,
the optimization problem in (15) can be solved by a two-
dimension numerical search method. To further facilitate the
numerical search, we derive closed-form expressions for RE as
functions of  in the following asymptotic scenarios, which
can reduce the two-dimensional numerical search to a one-
dimensional numerical search.
Proposition 3: As N ! 1, the optimal RE for a given 
is given by
R0E() = log2

1  E ln p0
(1  )E + 1

: (18)
Proof: As N !1, FE () in (7) is approximated as
FE ()  1  e 

1 
 +
1
E


: (19)
Then, by setting Op(;RE) = p0 we achieve the desirable
result in (18).
Proposition 4: As E !1, the optimal RE for a given 
is given by
R0E() = log2
0@1 + (N   1)

p
1=(1 N)
0   1

1  
1A : (20)
Proof: As E !1, FE () in (7) is approximated as
FE ()  1 

1 +
(1  ) 
 (N   1)
1 N
; (21)
which leads to the desirable result in (20).
B. Fully-Adaptive Scheme
In the fully-adaptive scheme, RB is chosen such that RB =
CB and RE is adaptively chosen for each eB = Bkhk2 [8].
Thus, its instantaneous secrecy rate as a function of  and RE
is given by
Rs(;RE) = [CB RE]+ = [log2(1 + eB) RE]+ : (22)
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Since RB, RE, and  are all adaptively chosen, Rs(;RE) > 0
can be always guaranteed in the fully-adaptive scheme. As
such, without considering any constraint on the secrecy outage
probability, Alice always transmits confidential information to
Bob with a positive Rs(;RE). However, a secrecy outage
occurs when CE > RE. Thus, the secrecy outage probability
of the fully-adaptive scheme is
Of (;RE)=Pr(CE>RE)=1 Ne 
(2RE 1)
E : (23)
In the fully-adaptive scheme, both  and RE are to be
optimized in order to maximize the instantaneous secrecy
rate Rs(;RE) for each eB, subject to an upper bound on
Of (;RE). Then, the optimal values of  and RE in the fully-
adaptive scheme can be obtained through
(z; RzE)= argmax
0<1;0<RE<CB
Rs(;RE);
s.t. Of (;RE)  p0: (24)
Noting Of (;RE) = Op(;RE) and that Rs(;RE) mono-
tonically decreases with RE as per (22), according to Propo-
sition 2 we can conclude that for any given , there is a
unique value of RE that maximizes Rs(;RE) subject to
Of (;RE)  p0 and this value is the one that guarantees
Of (;RE) = p0. Since the optimization is conducted for eacheB in (24), the signal processing complexity for the fully-
adaptive scheme is much higher than those for the partially-
adaptive and on-off schemes. We would like to highlight that
z and RzE can be derived in closed-form expressions for eacheB in the following asymptotic scenarios. Such closed-form
expressions are analytical solutions to (24).
Proposition 5: As N ! 1, the optimal values of  and
RE are given by
z =
s
ln p0 [(1 + ln p0 + eB)E + eB]
 2EeB(1 + ln p0)2(E + 1) 1   E + 1E(1 + ln p0) ;
RzE = log2

1  
zE ln p0
(1  )E + 1

;
where eB >  E ln p0=(E + 1).
Proof: Due to Of (;RE) = Op(;RE), Proposition 3 is
also valid for the fully-adaptive scheme. Substituting (18) into
Rs(;RE) in (22), we have the instantaneous secrecy rate as
Rs(;R
y
E())=log2(1+eB) log21  E ln p0(1 )E+1

:
(25)
Guaranteeing Rs(;R
y
E()) > 0 leads to
eB >   E ln p0
(1  )E + 1
>  E ln p0
E + 1
: (26)
Following (25), we define
g() , 2Rs(;R
y
E()) = A+B +
C
D+ E
; (27)
A =
eB
1 + ln p0
; C = (E + 1)(1 B);
B =
eB(E + 1)
E(1 + ln p0)
2
  eB   E + eBE
E(1 + ln p0)
; (28)
D =  E(1 + ln p0); E = E + 1:
Maximizing Rs(;R
y
E()) is equivalent to maximizing g()
as per (27). We next prove that g() is a concave function of .
Following (27), we have @2g()=@2 = 2D2C=(D+ E)3.
It is easy to prove that (D + E)3 > 0. Thus, the concavity
only requires C < 0, which requires 1   B < 0, since C =
(B + 1)(1 B) and B + 1 > 0. Following (28), we have
1 B = E(1 + ln p0) ln p0 +fB(1 + E) ln p0
(1 + ln p0)2E
: (29)
Using (26) and noting p0 < 1, we haveeB(1 + E) ln p0 <  E(ln p0)2: (30)
Substituting (30) into (29) and noting p0 < 1, we have
1 B < ln p0
(1 + ln p0)2
< 0: (31)
As such, we have proved that g() is a concave function of 
and we achieve the desirable results presented in Proposition 5
by setting Of (;RE) = p0 and @g()=@ = 0.
Proposition 6: As E ! 1, the optimal values of  and
RE are given by
z =
s
1eB

2eB
  1 +
eB
(  1)2   1

  1
  1 ;
RzE = log2

1  
z
(1  z)

;
where eB >   ln(p0) and  is given by
 = (N   1)

p
1
1 N
0   1

: (32)
Proof: The proof follows from Proposition 4 and is
similar to that of Proposition 5, which is omitted here.
We note that the maximum instantaneous secrecy rate
Rs(
z; RzE) is still a function of eB (and thus of khk). In
order to conduct the performance comparison among the three
schemes, we have to calculate the average maximum secrecy
rate of the fully-adaptive scheme over khk, which is given by
R
z
f =
Z 1
0
Rs(
z; RzE)feB(eB)deB; (33)
where feB(eB) denotes the pdf of eB given in [8].
C. On-Off Scheme
In the on-off scheme, RB is set such that RB = CB and the
secrecy rate Rs is fixed for each pair of B and E [5]. Thus,
we have the redundancy rate as RE = CB  Rs, which varies
with CB as well. Alice only transmits confidential information
to Bob when CB > Rs, and thus the transmission probability
of the on-off scheme is
Po(;Rs) = Pr(CB > Rs) =
 

N; 2
Rs 1
B

 (N)
: (34)
Then, the average secrecy rate achieved by the on-off scheme
can be written as
Ro(;Rs) = RsPo(;Rs): (35)
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The secrecy outage probability conditioned on a transmis-
sion of the on-off scheme is given by
Oo(;Rs) = Pr(CE > REjCB > Rs)
= 1  1  Pr(Cs < Rs)
Po(;Rs)
; (36)
where Pr(Cs < Rs) is the hybrid secrecy outage probability
given by [8, Eq. (18)].
In the on-off scheme, in addition to Rs,  is fixed for each
pair of B and E. Thus, the optimal values of  and Rs in
the on-off scheme can be achieved through
(; Rs)= argmax
0<1;Rs
Ro(;Rs); s.t. Oo(;Rs)  p0: (37)
We note that Ro(;Rs) is not a monotonic function of
Rs, since Po(;Rs) monotonically decreases with Rs. As
such, in the optimization presented in (37) we may not
have Oo(;Rs) = p0. Due to the complicated expression of
Oo(;Rs) given in (36), the uniqueness of  and Rs cannot
be theoretically proved and thus we adopt a two-dimensional
numerical search to solve the optimization problem in (37).
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
We present the secrecy performance comparison among
the three different AN-aided secure transmission schemes in
Fig. 1. We first observe that Rp(y; R
y
E) is much higher than
Ro(
; RE), which means that the partially-adaptive scheme
dramatically outperforms the on-off scheme. This is due to the
fact that when the main channel cannot support a fixed secrecy
rate Rs under the secrecy constraint in the on-off scheme, a
positive secrecy rate CB   RyE can still be achieved in the
partially-adaptive scheme. We note that the complexity of the
partially-adaptive scheme is slightly lower than that of the on-
off scheme, which is due to the fact that both RB and RE have
to be adjusted for each khk in the on-off scheme, while only
RB varies in the partially-adaptive scheme.
The negligible advantage of the the fully-adaptive scheme
compared with the partially-adaptive scheme is unexpected,
since , RB, and RE are chosen adaptively for each h in the
fully-adaptive scheme. The fact that only a minor advantage
is forthcoming for the fully-adpative scheme can be explained
as follows. Under the constraint Of (;RE)  p0, in the fully-
adaptive scheme a positive secrecy rate is achievable only
when eB is larger than some specific value, not for everyeB . This is explicitly confirmed by (26) in the asymptotic
scenarios. Thus, under the constraint Of (;RE)  p0, Alice
actually does not always transmit confidential information in
the fully-adaptive scheme, which is similar to what incurs in
the partially-adaptive scheme. We note that the complexity of
the fully-adaptive scheme is much higher than those of the
partially-adaptive and on-off schemes. This is due to the fact
that  and RE (or Rs) are optimized for each instantaneous
CSI of the main channel (i.e., khk) in the fully-adaptive
scheme, while they only have to be optimized for each pair
of the average SNRs (i.e., each pair of B and E) in the
partially-adaptive and on-off schemes.
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Fig. 1. Maximum average secrecy rate of the three schemes subject to the
upper bound p0 on the secrecy outage probability with N = 4 and 2 antennas
at Eve with the minimum mean square error (MMSE) combiner.
V. CONCLUSION
This work thoroughly examined the secrecy performance
of the partially-adaptive, fully-adaptive, and on-off schemes.
Unexpectedly, our examination demonstrates that the partially-
adaptive scheme significantly outperforms the on-off scheme,
which is of a similar complexity, and achieves almost the same
secrecy performance as the fully-adaptive scheme, which is of
a much higher complexity.
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